

**REPORT No. 35/15**

**CASE 11.609**

REPORT ON ADMISSIBILITY

RAMÓN ALIRIO PÉREZ ET. AL

ECUADOR

OEA/Ser.L/V/II.155

Doc. 14

22 July 2015

Original: spanish

Approved by the Commission at its Session No. 2035 held on July 22, 2015 at its 155th Period of Session.

**Cite as:** IACHR, Report No. 35/15, Case 11.609. Admissibility. Ramón Alirio Pérez y otros. Ecuador. July 22, 2015.

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# SUMMARY

1. On September 8, 1995, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission” or “the IACHR”) received a petition from the Ecumenical Commission for Human Rights (hereinafter “the petitioners”) on the alleged responsibility of the Republic of Ecuador (hereinafter “the State” or “Ecuador”) for the forced disappearance, illegal detention, torture, and deportation of four persons recognized as refugees in Ecuador (hereinafter “the alleged victims”). The petitioners claim that the State is responsible for violating the rights enshrined in Articles 5, 7, 8, 22, and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” or “the American Convention”) in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of that instrument.
2. The State, for its part, simply submitted documents on certain domestic proceedings. Furthermore, given that all of the records on the case in the State’s offices had been mislaid, the IACHR once again transmitted copies of the file and of the petitioners’ observations, on which the State has not commented.
3. After analyzing the positions of the parties and compliance with the requirements established in Articles 46 and 47 of the Convention, the Commission decided to find the petition admissible for purposes of examining the alleged violation of Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, 22, and 25 of the American Convention in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of the same instrument. Furthermore, the Commission considers that in the merits stage of the proceedings it should analyze the possible application of articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, with regard to all alleged victims, as well as article 7 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (hereinafter also “Convention of Belem do Para”), specifically with regard to Martha Cecilia Sanchez. Lastly, it decided to notify the parties of the report and to order its publication in its Annual Report to the General Assembly of the OAS.

# PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IACHR

1. On September 8, 1995, the Commission received the original petition transmitted by the petitioners, which was classified as case number 11.609. On July 24, 1996, the State responded by sending copies—some of which were illegible—of domestic proceedings pertaining to the present case.
2. The IACHR received observations from the petitioners on December 4, 1995; October 22, 1996; May 19, 1997; August 25, 2008; June 2, 2009; and July 16, 2013.
3. Likewise, the Commission received two additional communications from the State, on January 29, 1997, and on February 24, 1997, in which once again it sent copies of proceedings substantiated at the domestic level. In response to the April 9, 2009, request to the State for updated information, the State informed the IACHR that “there was not any open file or any documentation whatsoever” on the case in the national records of the State Public Prosecutor’s Office and it therefore asked the Commission “to kindly ask the petitioners for updated information on the case in order to enable it to take up the matter once again.” Consequently, on July 6, 2009, the IACHR transmitted copies of the file to the State along with the pertinent parts of the information provided by the petitioners and reiterated its request for updated information. In the absence of a response from the State, said request was reiterated on April 12, 2011, and on August 12, 2013. As of the approval of this report, the State has not submitted any response.

# POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

## **Position of the petitioners**

1. In their initial petition, the petitioners informed the IACHR that the alleged victims, Ramón Alirio Pérez Vargas, Martha Cecilia Sánchez, Chesman Cañón Trujillo, and Cesar Guillermo Díaz García,[[1]](#footnote-2) had been illegally detained, had temporarily disappeared, and tortured. They stated that the four alleged victims were Colombian nationals and had been recognized as refugees in Ecuador by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter “UNHCR”) and by the State. During the Commission’s processing of the case, the petitioners provided the following additional information.
2. They affirmed that, in 1995, Ecuadorian State agents had been informed by the Colombian consul that a group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (hereinafter “FARC”) would attack the then Colombian president, Ernesto Samper, during the IX Summit of the Rio Group, to be held in Quito from September 1 to 5, 1995. Consequently, the Land Force Command had ordered measures to be taken to identify and locate Colombian refugees in Ecuador with possible “subversive backgrounds.” Said command had decided that the Ecumenical Commission for Human Rights (CEDHU), the Latin American Human Rights Association (ALDHU), and the UNHCR Pro-Refugee Committee (CPR) should be kept under surveillance and control to determine whether said organizations were conducting activities that might endanger the lives of the presidents attending said meeting.
3. In keeping with those provisions, members of the armed forces purportedly detained the alleged victims on August 18, 1995. The petitioners specify that this was done without a judge’s issuing an arrest warrant against them and without their being found in flagrante delicto. They allege that they were physically attacked, blindfolded, and taken to a military barracks where they remained incommunicado for five days in an unsanitary cell and were subject to torture and interrogations. They specify that they did not have the assistance of legal counsel during that time. According to their claims, the purpose of the torture was to get them to confess to planning attacks against the domestic security of the State and to accuse Elsie Monge, Director of the Ecumenical Commission for Human Rights. Electricity was allegedly applied to their genitals, eyes, and ears. Martha Cecilia Sanchez was allegedly stripped naked and threatened with rape, had electric current applied to her breasts, and was forced to watch how her partner, Ramón Alirio Perez, was being tortured. The latter was forced to watch a video of his children that said that “they had them and would kill them.” In addition, hoods with water and gas were placed over them, covering their noses and mouths.
4. The petitioners add that on August 23, 1995, after being held incommunicado for five days, an army lieutenant colonel turned the alleged victims over to the Police Commissioner of Pichincha, telling them in writing that that they had been “interviewed” by members of the armed forces to verify “suspicions” against them and that the conclusion was allegedly reached that they were “FARC members” and that “they had not legally justified their status as victims of political persecution to enjoy legal protection in Ecuador” and recommending their immediate deportation. The Police Commissioner supposedly placed the alleged victims in custody of the National Police so that an investigation could be initiated on the charges formulated by the military. The petitioners allege that the alleged victims learned of those charges soon after being placed in the Police Commissioner’s hands. Similarly, they contend that the alleged victims were never personally brought before a judge or another official legally authorized to exercise judicial functions.
5. Given the impossibility of determining the whereabouts of the alleged victims, on August 23, 1995, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in their behalf with the Mayor of Quito. As the petitioners reported, the writ of habeas corpus was governed by the National Constitution in effect at that time, which stipulated that anyone who believed they were being detained illegally could file a writ of habeas corpus with the Mayor, who was to rule on it within 24 hours. However, in the case at hand, the appeal was rejected 14 days later, on grounds that on August 24, 1995, the Police Commissioner had initiated deportation proceedings against the alleged victims. In addition, the petitioners maintain that the fact that domestic law established a representative of the local executive as the person who was to rule on habeas corpus requests contravened the American Convention.
6. The deportation procedure was purportedly initiated on August 24, 1995, a formal arrest warrant having been issued against the alleged victims. As they stated, once they had been turned over to the Police Commissioner of Pichincha, Ramón Alirio Pérez Vargas, Chesman Cañón Trujillo, and Cesar Guillermo Díaz García were transferred to the “Garcia Moreno” prison (social rehabilitation center for men No. 1) and Martha Cecilia Sánchez to the “El Inca” women’s prison in Quito. In addition, the petitioners said that they underwent forensic examinations that very day, which showed that they had been tortured.
7. The petitioners claim that the Crime Investigation Bureau (OID) of Pichincha interrogated the alleged victims again and did not allow defense counsel to be present on that occasion either. This is borne out in their declarations, which were signed exclusively by the police officer, the prosecutor, and the alleged victims. As a result of that investigation, the Police Commissioner was supposedly informed that the alleged victims were not involved in illicit activities or in the planning of attacks. The petitioners point out that, on September 13, 1995, a hearing was held in which they provided an account of how they were detained by army forces, the threats they were subjected to, and the torture they suffered.
8. On September 14, 1995, the Police Commissioner allegedly stayed the proceedings against the alleged victims and, in accordance with the law, decided to submit his decision to the Minister of Government “for consultation.” Accordingly, on September 21, 1995, the Minister of Government upheld the decision and ordered the immediate release of the alleged victims “under police supervision.” Moreover, the Minister’s decision ordered their expulsion for “reasons of security and public order,” giving them 30 days to leave the national territory.
9. The petitioners claim that, for no reason whatsoever, the State had “stripped” the alleged victims of refugee status, which obliged them to seek asylum in another country. They argue that the UNHCR, in learning about the expulsion order, had to look for a safe third country to take them in since, if they returned to Colombia, their safety and their lives were be seriously at risk. They add that they were not permitted to have recourse to a judicial remedy to challenge the expulsion order since the alien act in effect on that date did not allow for any appeal against the Minister’s decision. Consequently, from that point on they would reside in another State as refugees. According to the petitioners, all of this also violated the alleged victims’ rights under articles 22.1 and 22.6 of the Convention.
10. The petitioners added that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure in effect at that time, the Police Commissioner also served as investigating judge in criminal matters when he or she was apprised of the commission of a criminal act. Accordingly, they point out that the information submitted by the military command and the declarations of the detainees indicated that there had been illegal detentions. The Commissioner was therefore obliged ex officio to institute the respective criminal proceedings against the responsible parties. However, the petitioners said, that did not occur. In addition, the forensic reports and the statements made by the detainees had made the Commissioner aware of the situation in which the alleged victims were held incommunicado and of the torture to which they were subjected. The Commissioner was thus also obliged to initiate the respective criminal proceedings against the alleged torturers.
11. This notwithstanding, they argue that the police institution itself, in 1996, had conducted an investigation of the facts, which determined that the victims had been illegally detained, tortured, and held incommunicado in military jail cells. The State should have therefore on its own initiative launched the respective criminal investigations of those responsible. Similarly, they maintain that the State could not expect the alleged victims to participate in any way in bringing about that action since they had been obliged to leave the country.
12. The petitioners conclude that, in the instant case, articles 5, 7, 8, 22, and 25 of the American Convention were violated, in relation to Article 1.1 thereof, to the detriment of the four alleged victims.

## **B. Position of the State**

1. The Commission notes that the State intervened four times in the processing of the present case and, in three of them, it simply submitted copies of domestic proceedings and of various reports pertaining to the case, without presenting specific legal arguments on the petition. In the fourth and final presentation, the State notified the IACHR that “there was not any open file or any documentation whatsoever” on the case in the national records of the State Public Prosecutor’s Office.
2. The IACHR will spell out the contents of the documents submitted by the State as annexes to its first three presentations, which shall be deemed to be the position of the State in the present case.
3. In its first presentation, the State transmitted a series of documents. The first of them[[2]](#footnote-3) was a report sent to the Head of the Crime Investigation Bureau of Pichincha, dated August 25, 1995, in which the four alleged victims appear as “detainees turned over to the authorities.” That report describes the factual circumstances of the present case. Specifically, it notes that since it was widely known that the Rio Summit would be held in Quito from September 1 to 5, 1995, the State security forces “focused their attention on gathering information and detecting possible extremists who [might] carry out actions that [could] jeopardize security.” According to the State, a few days earlier, the consul general of Colombia had said that he had been receiving threatening phone calls and that, on August 14, a bullet had struck one of the consulate’s windows. It also stated that “through confidential information” it was determined that Colombian extremists had entered the country to carry out an operation to free a person accused of kidnapping crimes. It is specified that there was “a verbal oral order” by the Head of the Police’s Special Investigation Unit to “conduct a detailed investigation” [sic] of the four alleged victims. The Ecuadorian Army therefore proceeded to detain them, on the suspicion that they were the individuals who would carry out attacks in the country. As explained in the report, the alleged victims were interrogated and placed in custody of the National Police on August 24, 1995. It is reported that they had stated that they were Colombian citizens residing in Ecuador as refugees protected by the UNHCR who had been detained by army forces on August 18, 1995, and that they were unaware of any information about attacks against government officials or about attempts to free persons deprived of liberty. In that report, the Chief Investigator and Police Major specifies, by way of “conclusions,” that “it had not been possible to establish that any of the detainees was responsible for or had taken part in” the possible attack against the Colombian president, or in the attack on the Colombian consulate, or in the possible escape of persons deprived of liberty, or in any illicit act.
4. In addition, the State transmitted the decision of the Minister of Government and Police dated September 21, 1995, upholding the stay of proceedings in favor of the alleged victims ordered on September 14 and providing for their immediate release under police supervision and, “for reasons of national security and public order,” giving them a period of 30 days to seek legal entry into another country, with the further obligation of having to appear once a week in the migration offices in Quito. The recitals of that decision indicate that, by a note dated August 23, 1995, the Intelligence Directorate of the Army General Command had said that the alleged victims had not legally justified their status as victims of political persecution to enjoy legal protection in Ecuador. It also pointed out that “the case file shows the danger that the accused represent to public order and national security and, inasmuch as it is appropriate, recognizing their status as refugees, apply Article 32 of the Agreement on the Situation of Refugees.”
5. The State also transmitted an informative report submitted to the Head of the Crime Investigation Bureau (OID) of Pichincha, dated June 11, 1996,[[3]](#footnote-4) which summarized the factual circumstances, specifying that, on August 23, 1995, the alleged victims had been placed in custody of the National Police. That document points out that the reason for which César Guillermo Díaz García had been detained was the suspicion that he was going to abduct the Colombian consul. The report also indicates that “with regard to [the alleged victims’] being illegally detained, tortured, and temporarily missing, it should be clarified that they had first been deprived of liberty by Ecuadorian Army Intelligence agents,” following a report by the Colombian consul to the Army Infantry Major on a possible attack on President Samper. Likewise it is pointed out that as of the date of that report, June 11, 1996, it had not been possible to question the alleged victims “since their whereabouts at that time were unknown.”
6. Finally, in its third presentation, the State submitted an undated “confidential” report drawn up by the Ministry of National Defense on the case. That report once again specified that, by order of the Ground Army Command, measures were taken “to verify the identities and domiciles of the Colombian national refugees in Ecuador with subversive backgrounds.” It notes that César Guillermo Díaz was detained after the Command had notified the consul that the FARC would abduct him or take over the consulate, which is why César Guillermo Díaz was placed under surveillance and was subsequently arrested along with Ramón Alirio Pérez Vargas, Chesman Cañón, and Martha Cecilia Sánchez. The report also states that the four alleged victims were detained, had subversive backgrounds, and were the subject of an intense search by Colombian security agents. Lastly, a final “recommendation” was offered “to take appropriate measures for the migration authorities to deport them.

# ANALYSIS

## **Competence**

1. In principle, petitioners are authorized by Article 44 of the American Convention to submit petitions to the Commission. The petition indicates, as alleged victims, individuals with respect to whom the Ecuadorian State agreed to respect and guarantee the rights enshrined in the American Convention. With regard to the State, Ecuador has been a State party to the American Convention since December 8, 1997; to the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture since November 9, 1999; and to the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women since September 15, 1995, when it deposited its respective instruments of ratification. Therefore, the IACHR is competent *ratione personae* to examine the petition
2. Likewise, the Commission is competent *ratione loci* to hear the petition, in that it alleges violations of rights protected by that instrument and occurring within the jurisdiction of Ecuador, a State party to the treaty.
3. The Commission is competent *ratione temporis* in that the obligation to respect and guarantee the rights protected in the Convention was already in effect for the State on the date when the events alleged in the petition occurred. The IACHR notes that the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture entered into force for Ecuador on December 9, 1999 and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women entered into force on October 15, 1995. Therefore, the IACHR is competent *ratione temporis* to analyze the facts of the case under these legal instruments only as of the respective dates.
4. Lastly, the Commission is competent *ratione materiae* because the petition denounces possible violations of human rights protected by the American Convention, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women.

## **B. Admissibility requirements**

### **Exhaustion of domestic remedies**

1. Article 46.1.a of the American Convention establishes that, for a petition to be admitted by the Commission, the remedies under domestic law must have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. The petitioners specified that, given the impossibility of establishing the whereabouts of the alleged victims, on August 23, 1995, a writ of habeas corpus was filed with the office of the Mayor of Quito, who, under the Constitution then in effect, was the authority responsible for verifying the legality of a detention within a period of 24 hours. The mayor issued his decision on September 6, 1995, 14 days later, denying the request for release, arguing that at the time of the ruling a preventive detention order issued by the Police Commissioner was in effect against the alleged victims, in the context of deportation proceedings. The petitioners contended that habeas corpus was the appropriate remedy to use since it protected personal liberty against arbitrary detentions. However, in that specific case, it did not prove to be effective inasmuch as it was rejected by a “merely formal” response and on grounds that the Commissioner had already ordered the deprivation of liberty. According to the petitioners, the remedy was apparently decided on without any consideration of whether or not there were grounds for detention. In addition, they said that in the deportation proceedings the alleged victims could not challenge the expulsion order because the law then in effect established that there was no possible appeal against the Ministry of Government’s decision.
3. In numerous precedents, the Commission has time and again upheld the rule that for the objection to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies to be timely, it must be raised in the early stages of the proceedings; failure to do so allows one to assume a tacit rejection by the State of said objection.[[4]](#footnote-5) In this connection, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that, for the objection to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies to be timely, it “must be made in the first measure taken by the State during the proceedings before the Commission.”[[5]](#footnote-6)
4. The Commission reiterates that the State did not offer any argument about the petition’s admissibility but rather merely submitted copies of documents and various proceedings pertaining to the case. Therefore, that attitude suggests that the State has tacitly relinquished raising an objection to the exhaustion of domestic remedies in the present petition. This notwithstanding, the Commission considers that, in the instant case, a ruling on the appeal for habeas corpus took an inordinate amount of time, which might have made it ineffective. Moreover, with respect to the deportation order, the petitioners alleged that domestic law did not allow it to be challenged, which the State did not contest. The Commission is therefore of the view that in the case at hand the petitioners have met the exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies provided in Articles 46.2.a and 46.2.b of the Convention.

### **Timeliness of the petition**

1. Article 46.1.b of the American Convention establishes that for a petition to be admissible before the Commission, it must be lodged within six months from the date on which the party alleging the violation of rights was notified of the final decision.
2. It follows then from the facts of the present case that the exhaustion of domestic remedies occurred when the case was being examined for admissibility. Under these circumstances, the Commission has consistently taken the view that fulfillment of the requirement regarding the time period for lodging the petition is intrinsically linked to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and should therefore be regarded as complied with.[[6]](#footnote-7)
3. Therefore, in view of the context and nature of the case, the Commission finds that the petition was lodged within a reasonable time and that the admissibility requirement regarding timeliness must be considered as met.

### **Duplication of international proceedings**

1. There is no indication whatsoever in the case record that the subject matter of this petition is pending in another proceeding before an international adjudicatory body, or that it reproduces a petition that has already been ruled on by the Inter-American Commission. Therefore, the IACHR concludes that the exceptions set forth in Articles 46.1.d and 47.d of the American Convention are not applicable.

### **Nature of the alleged events**

1. Neither the American Convention nor the IACHR Rules of Procedure require a petitioner to identify the specific rights allegedly violated by the State in the matter brought before the Commission, although petitioners may do so. It is for the Inter-American Commission, based on the system's jurisprudence, to determine in its admissibility reports which provisions of the relevant Inter-American instruments are applicable and could be found to have been violated if the alleged facts are proven by sufficient elements.
2. In view of the elements of fact and law presented by the parties and the nature of the claim submitted for its analysis, the IACHR considers that the petitioner's allegations, if proven, could lead to international responsibility of the State for the violation of Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, 22, and 25 of the Convention in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2, to the detriment of Ramón Alirio Pérez Vargas, Martha Cecilia Sánchez, Chesman Cañón Trujillo, and Cesar Guillermo Díaz García. Furthermore, the Commission considers that in the merits stage of the proceedings it should analyze the possible application of articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; article 7 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, specifically with regard to Martha Cecilia Sanchez; as well as the conditions under which these legal instruments are enforceable in light of the time restrictions set forth in this report.

# CONCLUSIONS

1. Based on the foregoing considerations of fact and law, and without prejudging the merits of the case, the Commission concludes that the present case meets the admissibility requirements set forth in Articles 46 and 47 of the American Convention, and therefore,

**THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,**

**DECIDES:**

1. To declare this petition admissible with regard to Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, 22, and 25 in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention, articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and article 7 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women.
2. To notify the State and the petitioner of this decision.
3. To continue with the analysis of the merits of the case.
4. To publish this decision and include in its Annual Report to the General Assembly of the OAS.

Done and signed in the city of Washington, D.C., on the 22nd day of the month of July, 2015. (Signed): Rose-Marie Belle Antoine, President; James L. Cavallaro, First Vice President; José de Jesús Orozco Henríquez, Second Vice President; Felipe González, Rosa María Ortiz, Tracy Robinson and Paulo Vannuchi, Commissioners.

1. The name of this alleged victim is different in diverse communications; it appears as “César Sánchez” (original petition), “Césaro Guillermo Díaz García” (9/5/1995), and “César Díaz” (9/25/1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Report No. 3311-OID-P, August 25, 1995, signed by Police Major Wilfredo Chuga Urbina. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Informative Report No.1257-OID-P, dated June 11, 1996, drawn up by Police Corporal Alberto Vallejo. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. IACHR, Report No. 171/10, Petition 578-03, Admissibility, Miguel Ángel Millar Silva et al., Chile, November 1, 2010, para. 28; IACHR, Report No. 26/08, Petition 270-02, Admissibility, César Alberto Mendoza et al., Argentina, March 14, 2008, para. 74; IACHR, Report No. 71/05, Petition 543-04, Admissibility, Ever de Jesús Montero Mindiola, Colombia, October 13, 2005, para. 14; IACHR, Report No. 12/02, Admissibility, Petition 12.090, Jesús Enrique Valderrama Perea, Ecuador, February 27, 2002, para. 16; IACHR, Report No. 8/02, Admissibility, Petition 11.482, Noel Emiro Omeara Carrascal, Guillermo Omeara Miraval and Héctor Alvarez Sánchez, Colombia, February 27, 2002, para. 30; IACHR, Report No. 39/02, Admissibility, Petition 12.328, Adolescents in the Custody of the FEBEM, Brazil, October 9, 2002, para. 39; IACHR, Report No. 85/01, Case 12.084, Workers of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima and the Municipal Services Company of Lima, Peru, October 10, 2001, para. 18; IACHR, Report No. 125/01, Case 12.388, Yatama, Nicaragua, December 3, 2001, para. 19; IACHR, Report No. 39/97, Case 11.233, Martín Javier Roca Casas, Peru, February 19, 1998, para. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. I/A Court H.R. *Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador*. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 179, para. 40; *Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname*. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 43; *Case of García Prieto et al. v. El Salvador*. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2007. Series C No. 168, para. 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. *See, among others:* IACHR, Report No. 92/14, Petition P-1196-03. Admissibility. Daniel Omar Camusso and Son. Argentina. November 4, 2014, para. 80; IACHR. Report 8/10. Case 12.374. Admissibility. Jorge Enrique Patiño Palacios et al. Paraguay. March 16, 2010. para. 31; and IACHR. Report 20/05. Petition 716/00. Admissibility. Rafael Correa Díaz. Peru. February 25, 2005. para. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)