

**INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOLUTION TO FOLLOW UP AND EXTEND PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES 4/2026**

Precautionary Measure No. 73-24

Members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council regarding Colombia

January 19, 2026

Original: Spanish

(Follow-up and Extension)

I. SUMMARY

1. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) issues this resolution to follow up and extend precautionary measures pursuant to the terms of Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure. The IACHR analyzes the continuing risk identified in its 2024 resolution granting the precautionary measures and decides to extend them in favor of all members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council, located in Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca. The Commission observes that the context of violence that gave rise to the granting of precautionary measures has intensified, characterized by the presence and territorial dispute between various illegal armed groups, who exercise control through threats, extortion, harassment, and acts of violence. In particular, the strategy of armed groups aimed at controlling maritime mobility, the central axis of community life, is highlighted. The Commission appreciates the efforts made by the State to implement protection measures and notes that the information available indicates that these have not been suitable to mitigate the risk. The Commission expresses its concern at the murder of Alan Valencia, a young member of the Community Council and a direct family member of one of the beneficiaries, in September 2025, a fact that materializes the risk and shows the extent of the violence against the group. Consequently, the Commission considers the procedural requirements to extend the scope of the precautionary measures to all members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council, in Colombia, to be accredited.

II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2. On April 8, 2024, the IACHR granted precautionary measures in favor of 13 territorial authorities, social leaders, and defenders of ethnic-territorial rights of the Community Council of the black communities of La Plata Bahía Málaga, located in Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca.¹ According to the request, the proposed beneficiaries were at risk due to threats, harassment and the recent incursion of an illegal armed group into their territory.

3. Under the terms of Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure, the IACHR requested that the State of Colombia: a) adopt the necessary and culturally appropriate measures to safeguard the life and personal integrity of the beneficiaries. Among other things, it is requested to take the relevant measures to guarantee that they can safely return to their community; b) adopt the necessary protection measures so that the beneficiaries can continue carrying out their activities in defense of human rights without being subjected to threats, intimidation, harassment or acts of violence; c) consult and agree upon the measures to be adopted with the beneficiaries and/or their representatives; and d) report on the actions taken to investigate the alleged facts that gave rise to these precautionary measures, so as to prevent such events from reoccurring.²

¹ IACHR, [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, Thirteen members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council regarding Colombia, April 8, 2024. The beneficiaries and their positions at the time were as follows: (1) Saul Valencia González, legal representative of the community council; (2) Isnel Díaz Arboleda, coordinating councilor of the community council; (3) Argenis García Valencia, administrative councilor of the community council; (4) Rut Valencia Manyoma, secretary councilor of the community council; (5) José Simón Gamboa, planning councilor of the community council; (6) Mireya Díaz Mosquera, alternate secretary of the community council; (7) Neida Molano Díaz, alternate treasurer of the community council; (8) Albeiro Palma Moreno, principal observer of the community council; (9) Edier Rebolledo Salazar, alternate observer of the community council; (10) Hoover Carabali Playonero, council of elders of the territory; (11) Santiago Valencia González, council of elders of the territory; (12) Ferney Valencia Belalcázar, no specified position; and (13) Carlos Andrés Hinojosa Victoria, council of elders of the territory.

² IACHR, [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited.

4. The representation of the precautionary measures is exercised by the NOMADESC association.

III. INFORMATION PROVIDED DURING THE TIME THESE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES HAVE BEEN IN FORCE

5. During the time the precautionary measures have been in force, the Commission has sent requests for information to the parties. In this regard, communications were received from the parties and sent from the IACHR on the following dates:

	State	Communications by the representation	IACHR
2024	May 10, July 11	April 22, August 27, November 20, December 9 and 11	April 10, June 7, September 24, November 26, December 10
2025	January 23, October 2 and 27, December 19	March 17, August 29, September 15 and 30, November 4	January 7, February 7, August 7, September 12 and 23, October 9 and 17

6. During the time the precautionary measures have been in force, the representatives have requested the extension of the precautionary measures on three occasions and with respect to three groups of people: On August 29, 2025, in favor of Andrés Felipe Moreno Díaz; on September 15, 2025, in favor of the entire Community Council; and on September 30, 2025, in favor of Alan Valencia's family. These requests were forwarded to the State, who submitted its observations on October 27 and December 19, 2025.

A. Information provided by the representation

7. The La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council is a black community legally recognized as such. It upholds diverse cultural practices linked to its territory, which includes maritime, island, and continental areas, and it is organized under a system of self-governance that regulates internal and external social relations. On November 4, 2025, the representatives reported that, according to the most recent population census conducted by the National Land Agency in 2024, 274 families and 729 individuals were identified, of whom 365 are men and 364 are women.

8. The representatives stated that the Community Council is composed of an Assembly, the decision-making body made up of all individuals of legal age included in the census, which appoints a Board of Directors. While the Board of Directors is responsible for managing political and organizational affairs, there are also leaders who are not members of that body. Likewise, the Community Council comprises various associations organized around the cultural and economic activities of the territory.

9. The representatives reported that La Plata Bahía Málaga is a "coastal community territory" made up of four communities (La Plata, Miramar, La Sierpe, and Mangaña), whose way of life is tied to the sea, around which most social activities take place. Children from the community travel to their schools by boat; fishermen carry out their work in boats or canoes; women shellfish gatherers reach the mangroves using the same types of vessels; and tourists also arrive in the area by sea. The representatives warned that the strategy of the armed groups has consisted of restricting the center of social and cultural life of La Plata Bahía Málaga by controlling maritime transport, since this is the only means to access the territory.

10. The representatives warned that the paramilitary groups that operate in Buenaventura have given rise to urban structures called "Los Shottas" and "Los Espartanos." In the rural area, the territory is currently controlled by the dissidents of the FARC "Jaime Martínez." It was pointed out that, although the Buenaventura Socio-Legal Working Group was established in 2023 with the participation of "Los Shottas" and "Los Espartanos," 225 violent deaths have been reported since then. The ongoing threat posed by these groups gradually shifted to urban areas, where most community leaders and displaced communities arrive.

11. Since 2024, following the community's refusal to pay extortion demands, targeted attacks of varying intensity have been carried out, as armed actors collectively hold the community responsible for not

allowing their activities and for refusing to comply with their demands. The representatives referred to incidents affecting the community, including threats made against a teacher at the school located within the community council on January 30, 2024; threats to steal boats issued in July 2023 and January 2024, followed by the actual theft of those boats in February 2024; threats involving firearms on October 25, 2024 by armed groups seeking to gain territorial control of the area; and other robberies that were not reported due to the risk of reprisals.

12. The representatives argued that the attacks on the boats play a strategic role, as they target those belonging to the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council rather than boats from nearby tourist facilities. According to the representatives, attacking the boats effectively curtails all social dynamics of the Community Council. It was emphasized that the community is subjected to harassment because it is not involved in either legal or illegal economies. The representatives indicated that the bay where the various communities within the Community Council are located has a public security presence, both from the National Police and the Navy, which operates one of the largest naval bases in the Colombian Pacific nearby.

13. On April 22, 2024, the representatives added that, following the adoption of the precautionary measures, the State reactivated the risk assessment processes and the allocation of security arrangements. However, they stated that such measures would not be culturally appropriate and questioned the suitability of panic buttons or protective vests, emphasizing the collective nature of the harm suffered by the Bahía Málaga community. In addition, it was argued that these measures did not cover all members of the Community Council, since their positions are rotational, and that collective protection is essential for the community; as only through such protection could leaders continue to carry out their work of self-governance and the defense of ethnic and territorial rights. The representatives expressed concern about education in the area, given that teachers in the community had been subjected to threats. For example, in Mangaña, teaching has been suspended since January 22, 2024, and in Miramar, two teachers resigned from their positions. The representatives warned that the community was in a situation of “near-total confinement,” which had a direct impact on its food sovereignty. In addition, outside boats reportedly circled the rural hamlets in order to create a constant state of fear, without the National Navy taking action despite the commitments undertaken during the 2024 Humanitarian Mission³.

14. The representatives emphasized that one of the commitments undertaken within the framework of that Humanitarian Mission was that the National Navy would act in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. However, on some occasions it was reportedly the Navy itself that committed violations against residents. The representatives stated, without specifying the exact date, that a family traveling within the territory was detained and intimidated, and that the children were threatened at gunpoint.

³ The representation indicated that the 2024 Bahía Málaga Humanitarian Mission intended to verify the allegations of the community on the ground. During this mission, government entities adopted commitments in three thematic areas: guarantees of prevention, protection and humanitarian care; peace and security; and legal clarification of the territory. The representation alleged that the overall balance of those commitments is negative because, up to the time of their communication, none of them had been fulfilled.

The Humanitarian Mission was carried out in the Community Council of the Black Communities of La Plata Bahía Málaga on February 5 and 6, 2024, by call of the Process of Black Communities – Palenque el Congal, the NOMASDESC Association and the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council. On behalf of the national government, the Mission consisted of the Presidential Advisor for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, accompanied by delegates from the Vice-Presidency of the Republic; the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace; the Human Rights Directorate and the Directorate of Affairs for Black, Afro-Colombian, Raizal and Palenquero Communities of the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry of Defense; the Victims Unit; and the National Protection Unit. During the Humanitarian Mission, the communities of La Sierpe, Miramar, and La Plata were visited. The community of Mangaña could not be visited due to lack of safety guarantees in the territory. The visit to the community of Miramar also included the participation of the Pacific Regional Ombudsperson and his team, the Secretariat of Government and the Peace Manager of the District Mayor’s Office of Buenaventura, the representative to the Chamber Alejandro Ocampo, a delegate of the Secretariat of Territorial Peace and Reconciliation of the Valle Government. Along with the commission of the District Mayor’s Office, the Valle Government, the Ombudsperson’s Office, and Congressman Alejandro Ocampo, who participated in the visit to the community of Miramar, two spokespersons of the Shottas organization were transported to the Instance of Socio-Legal Dialogues between the Colombian government and Shottas and Espartanos. See: IACHR, [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, note 9 and para. 17.

On an unspecified date, the Navy allegedly entered the home of one of the community leaders, threw him to the ground, and pointed their service weapons at him and his family.

15. On August 27, 2024, the representatives reported that the previous day two boats were stolen in the hamlet of La Sierpe, one of which belonged to the Community Council and was primarily used to carry out monitoring and surveillance patrols for collective protection and the defense of governance in the territory. The second one belonged to a resident of the Community Council. After learning of the events, beneficiary Saúl Valencia contacted the Navy commander to report what had occurred. The representatives warned that the theft occurred amid repeated threats and incursions by armed actors into the hamlets of the Community Council, which had already been reported. Between January and August 2024, five incidents of theft, threats, or extortion targeting the Council's boats were reported.

16. On November 20, 2024, the representatives reported that on September 10, 2024 an individual who claimed to belong to an armed group, without specifying which one, approached the Bahía Málaga Community Council stating that he was the leader of the area and that, as such, the community had to begin paying him. That individual threatened that anyone who did not comply with his demands would be forcibly disappeared. Two days later, the individual appeared again before the community demanding that the payments be made; to which Andrés Felipe Moreno Díaz, a leader of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council from the community of Mangaña, replied that they would not comply with his demands. In light of possible reprisals, Andrés Felipe left the community and relocated to the city with his family on September 12, 2024. The representatives underscored that these events had been reported and that at least eight complaints had been filed by the community, despite fears of retaliation. Two of those proceedings, for example, were dismissed due to the failure to identify the perpetrator, without investigative activities having been carried out.⁴

17. With regard to protection measures, the representatives specified that, on August 6, 2024, a collective risk workshop was held and that the National Protection Unit (UNP) initiated an emergency procedure to assign measures for the beneficiaries. At the follow-up meeting on September 6, 2024, they warned the competent authorities that the provision of panic buttons and bulletproof vests was not suitable for the effective protection of the beneficiaries, given that the territory in which they moved lacked signal or coverage. By a resolution dated August 5, 2024, the State implemented protection measures in favor of beneficiary Santiago Valencia, consisting of a personal protection officer with a differential and/or trusted approach, a ballistic vest, and a means of communication, while discontinuing the provision of a panic button. The beneficiary filed an appeal for reversal against that resolution because the measures provided were not suitable to protect him in the areas where the highest risk situations occurred, namely during maritime travel and within the territory of the Community Council itself.

18. On December 11, 2024, the representatives stated that, due to the fear among community members of reporting incidents and in the exercise of his role as legal representative of the Community Council of the black communities of La Plata Bahía Málaga, beneficiary Saúl Valencia filed several complaints related to the security situation and the guarantee of human rights in the territory. The eight complaints, filed between 2023 and 2024, were at the preliminary inquiry stage. The representatives reported that on December 5, 2024 a boat from the territory was stopped on its way from the tourist pier of Buenaventura, the occupants' cell phones were seized, and a threatening message was sent to the authorities and the population of the territory. On December 8, 2024, another boat heading toward the Community Council was intercepted, the crew was

⁴ The first of these processes responds to a complaint brought to the attention of the Prosecutor's Office 40. The facts refer to the interception and theft of ship remittances by armed groups on June 29, July 7, and July 29, 2024. The second investigation concerns the theft of two boats belonging to the Community Council, on August 26, 2024, in the early hours. In both orders to close the case, the prosecutor indicated that "it can already be assured that the results of the investigation will not yield any results in the tasks that were ordered, since the assessment of the information contained in the complaint makes it impossible to construct an investigative hypothesis, due to a lack of information."

robbed, and they were given a verbal message stating that the attacks would continue if the community continued to refuse to pay extortion.

19. On March 17, 2025, the representatives stated that all investigations remained at the preliminary inquiry stage. They also indicated that the individual measures implemented for Santiago Valencia and Argenis Valencia were not suitable and were therefore challenged through appeals for reversal. On August 5, 2024, the Committee for Risk Assessment and Recommendation of Measures (CERREM) recommended adjusting the protection measures assigned to Santiago Valencia. It confirmed the provision of a ballistic vest, discontinued the panic button, and implemented a personal protection officer with a differential and/or trusted approach, as well as a means of communication. The beneficiary filed an appeal for reversal because the approved communication equipment and panic button did not function due to signal issues inherent to the area where he moved. Regarding the personal protection officer, they emphasized that their presence increased his visibility, exposing him to greater risk. This appeal was rejected as time-barred. Likewise, an appeal for reversal was filed against a resolution dated November 1, 2024; which, after assessing Argenis Valencia's risk as extraordinary, ordered the provision of a ballistic vest and a means of communication for a period of 12 months, as well as 1.5 statutory monthly minimum wages for a three-month period as relocation support. In assessing Argenis Valencia's risk situation, CERREM identified in Buenaventura-Valle the presence of two structures of the residual organized armed group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Jaime Martínez and Rafael Aguilera; two organizations of the organized armed group National Liberation Army (ELN), Ernesto Che Guevara Front and Omar Silgado Company; three organized crime groups known as "La Local," "La Alianza," and "La Empresa"; and two organized common crime groups called "Los Shottas" and "Los Espartanos." The representatives also noted that a collective risk assessment had been carried out, without specifying the exact date, but that no measures of that nature had been implemented.

20. On August 29, 2025, the representatives alleged that incidents against the community persisted, despite the nearby presence of the National Navy's Pacific Naval Base. On April 19, 2025, the boat of Rubén Darío Canga Caicedo, fiscal overseer of the Community Council, was stolen during the early morning hours. After locating those who had taken the vessel, the Navy was contacted and arrived hours later, when the boat had already been stripped of its engine, accessories, and fuel. The representatives indicated that educational staff continued to be threatened and that in some cases activities had been suspended.

21. The representatives reported that Andrés Felipe Moreno Díaz, like Saúl Valencia, is publicly recognized in the territory for his leadership activities and defense of community rights. They referred to the developments following the threats to the community on September 10, 2024. On December 5, 2024, the individual who threatened the community was arrested in the context of a criminal proceeding for the offense of attempted aggravated extortion and received information that allowed him to identify Andrés Felipe Moreno and Saúl Valencia as the complainants. Despite not having access to a cell phone, he sent audio messages and issued threats against both, demanding that they "withdraw the complaint" filed against him. He stated that "people like that are to be taken and one can do whatever one wants with them." On December 10, 2024, he sent threatening audios indicating that "if they do not get him out, he will cause havoc." At the indictment hearing, both beneficiary Saúl Valencia and Andrés Moreno were recognized as victims. On December 12, 2024, a person close to both complainants warned them that "the person issuing the threats is about to be released from jail and has said that as soon as he gets out he will kill you" and that "when he got out, both of you would be dead, that he would kill you, kill you." These facts were reported to the Prosecutor's Office on August 27, 2025. On June 20, 2025, the Public Prosecutor's Office filed charges against the individual, and on August 27, 2025 he was released due to the expiration of statutory time limits. The representatives added that beneficiary Saúl Valencia had an individual security scheme that could not be extended to his territory, and that Andrés Felipe Moreno Díaz had no protection mechanism, which is why he left the territory for safety. They reported that selective thefts of community boats and extortion continued. They also reported that a follow-up meeting on the implementation of the precautionary measures took place on July 17, 2025, but no agreements or defined roadmap were reached.

22. On September 15, 2025, the representatives reported that Alan Valencia, a 17-year-old member of the Community Council of La Plata, Bahía Málaga and nephew of two beneficiaries of these

precautionary measures (Santiago Valencia and Saúl Valencia) was murdered on September 11, 2025. It was noted that the attack occurred within a dual context: attacks against the families of leaders opposed to the presence of armed groups in the territories, and targeted attacks against members of the Community Council. The representatives mentioned that until then the attacks had been limited to the maritime route leading to the territory and the territory itself, and had taken the form of thefts, threats, and extortion. They emphasized that Alan Valencia's murder indicated that the focus of the attacks had expanded and that the threat now extended to the community with the aim of creating exemplary acts. They stressed that, given the characteristics of the territory, the protection measures implemented to date were not suitable. There was no telephone or satellite signal, so mobile devices or panic buttons would not function. It was stated that UNP personnel provided accompaniment only up to the port of Buenaventura; so when maritime transport, which is unavoidable to access the community, was taken, protection would cease.

23. On September 29, 2025, the representatives alleged the existence of collective and individualizable persecution. It is collective in that its objective is to destroy the foundations of the social organization and cultural identity of the Community Council. It is individualizable because, to achieve that end, specific community members are targeted, including those who transport goods for economic sustenance, engage in tourism activities, or exercise leadership in the territory. The representatives warned that the situation of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council evidenced the possibility of extermination of a politically and culturally organized community through the alteration of its identity-based way of life and through the physical disappearance of its members.

24. In the representatives' view, that risk extended even to family members and close associates, as demonstrated by Alan Valencia's murder. In this regard, they referred specifically to Alan Valencia's family⁵. They stated that his father belongs to the Community Council and is a community leader. Alan Valencia's family is connected by family ties to two of the most recognized leaders in the territory, Saúl Valencia and Santiago Valencia, who have spoken out against extractive economic activities and the presence of armed groups. The family reportedly remained in constant transit between the Community Councils of La Plata and Bazan Bocana and the urban area of Buenaventura, along the route where Bahía Málaga boats have been selectively intercepted.

25. Alan Valencia's case led universities to propose a return to virtual classes, as during the pandemic, while parents preferred not to send their children to school due to the lack of guarantees. The representatives reported that the consequences of forced displacement, confinement, and the humanitarian crisis led civil society bodies participating in the Socio-Legal Working Group to request from the National Government, on September 24, 2025, a special and comprehensive intervention plan for Buenaventura to safeguard the lives of young people, children, and adolescents, to be agreed upon with territorial organizations.

26. On November 4, 2025, the representatives reported that, pursuant to a resolution dated April 15, 2025, the UNP ordered the implementation of collective protection measures such as 13 means of communication and a type 1 protection scheme consisting of a conventional vehicle and two protection persons with an ethnic differential approach. In full, the resolution ordered: forty (40) point-to-point radios and four (4) base radios with alternative power sources (solar panels) for use by the Community Council of the black communities of La Plata Bahía Málaga; a security study of facilities and implementation of recommendations within the UNP's competence; thirteen (13) cellular communication devices for members of the Community Council's board; one (1) type 1 protection scheme consisting of one (1) conventional vehicle and two (2) protection persons with an ethnic differential approach; and two (2) fiberglass boats with capacity for fifteen (15) persons each for collective use.

27. Regarding Alan Valencia's family, the representatives added that, following the funeral services after the young man's death, his nuclear family gained visibility. On September 14, 2025, they received

⁵ The representation indicated that it is composed of his parents, Gervasia Cuero Santana and Josué Valencia; and his maternal grandparents, Julio Cuero Salas and Rosa Elisa Zambrano.

personal messages urging them to be careful, to leave, or to stop their complaints, which was reported to the authorities. The representatives warned that while the grandparents refused to leave their home, the parents had to relocate to the Community Councils of Bazán Bocana, in the mother's case, and La Plata, in the father's case.

B. Response from the State

28. On May 10, 2024, the State reported on security and self-protection measures for Saúl Valencia and indicated that he had been assigned a ballistic vest and a means of communication. It reported that in February 2024 a Humanitarian Mission was carried out in the territory, pursuant to which it was agreed that periodic patrols would be conducted from the Bahía Málaga Naval Base in the territory of the Community Council. The UNP also prioritized six cases and it was agreed that a workshop would be held between the entity and community leaders. The State indicated that three investigations for threats against the beneficiaries were active and that another investigation, also related to threats, had been dismissed in 2022.⁶

29. On July 11, 2024, the State highlighted that in March 2024 the Ministry of the Interior requested activation of the emergency procedure for Santiago Valencia, Ferney Valencia, Argenis García, and Rubén Caiga, and noted that they were at risk due to the presence of various armed groups in the District of Buenaventura; such as the ELN, EMC, Segunda Marquetalia, AGC (Clan del Golfo), structures such as the Shottas, Espartanos, La Empresa, Los Chiquillos or Los Roberts, and transnational organized crime groups such as Jalisco New Generation and the Sinaloa Cartel. Protection measures were implemented for certain beneficiaries, and work orders were active for Argenis García Valencia, Hoover Carabalí Playonero, and Santiago Valencia. For Argenis García Valencia and Santiago Valencia González relocation support, an armored vest, and a means of communication were implemented, respectively. For Saúl Valencia, a ballistic vest and a means of communication were implemented. In addition, a light protection scheme consisting of one personal protection officer and transportation support was provided. The State also provided information on recent actions taken in the investigations related to the beneficiaries and indicated that the Territorial Security Delegate of the Office of the Attorney General (of Colombia) requested progress in those investigations.⁷

30. On July 24, 2024, the State held a follow-up meeting in Bogotá. At that meeting, the Office of the Inspector General committed to monitoring the issue of teacher resignations in the community due to security reasons. The Office of the Attorney General (of Colombia) committed to submitting a report addressing the appropriate unit to handle the investigations and the possibility of their consolidation. The Ministry of Equality assumed the responsibility of providing support regarding various programs or projects and issues related to climate change and ancestral knowledge. The National Ombudsperson's Office committed to visiting shelters and monitoring Early Warning 039 of 2023. The Ministry of the Interior, in turn, requested activation of the emergency procedure for the beneficiaries. The UNP, for its part, indicated that it would provide culturally appropriate support to the protection routes initiated.

31. On July 27, 2024, the Ministry of the Interior sent a communication to the UNP requesting activation of an emergency procedure for the beneficiaries, emphasizing the presence of various armed groups in the District of Buenaventura. On August 16, 2024, a follow-up meeting was held with the Ministry of Equality,

⁶ Four ongoing investigations were detailed before the Prosecutor's Office 32 - Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders and Trade Unionists Unit for acts of threats. The investigation for threats against Saúl Valencia, under file 761096000163202410010, was active and on February 13, 2024, a selective database search was carried out. Another investigation for threats against Saúl Valencia, under file 761096000164202300838, was active and on September 25, 2023, people were identified. The investigation for threats against Argenis García Valencia, under file 761096000164202000824, was active, but no actions were reported. The investigation for threats against Hoover Carabalí Playonero, under file 761116000165202153955, was filed for atypical conduct on December 30, 2022.

⁷ The information sent on May 10, 2024, on the investigations for threats regarding Saúl Valencia, Argenis Valencia and Hoover Carabalí Playonero was reiterated. On the other hand, it was reported that an investigation for threats against Argenis Valencia, under file 761096108682201600036, was filed on July 9, 2021 due to the impossibility of establishing the offender.

where programs of the Vice Ministry for Ethnic Peoples and Peasant Communities were presented and it was agreed that the representatives would indicate a date for a technical working group, establish a liaison, and socialize project submission formats.

32. On January 23, 2025, the State reported that investigations into threats against Saúl Valencia and Argenis García Valencia remained active. The State provided information on investigations related to complaints filed by the representing organization:

Acts	Identifier	Entity	State	Actions
Extortion	761096000163202300759	Prosecutor's Office 61	Inactive	Deactivated for consolidation due to procedural relatedness with case No. 761096000164202200147 on December 3, 2024
Manufacture, trafficking, and carrying of weapons reserved for the armed forces	761096000163202400091	Prosecutor's Office 04	Active	The judge authorized targeted database searches on December 3, 2024
Theft	761116000165202411778	Prosecutor's Office 40	Active	The Prosecutor's Office received the case on November 12, 2024 and is still gathering information
Theft	761116000165202416385	Prosecutor's Office 40	Inactive	Dismissed on September 19, 2024 due to the inability to identify the perpetrator
Theft	761116000165202416338	Prosecutor's Office 40	Inactive	Dismissed on September 23, 2024 due to the inability to identify the perpetrator
Threats	761096000163202401002	Prosecutor's Office 60	Inactive	Consolidated with case No. 761096000163202400843 at the request of GAULA on September 23, 2024

33. On October 27, 2025, the State indicated that the Army maintained a permanent operational deployment in the Bahía Málaga area under a Strategic Plan and that various actions were carried out in 2024 and 2025. On July 17, 2025, a consultation meeting was held in Bogotá. At that meeting, the Ministry of Defense committed to conducting periodic operations in the collective territory of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council between August and December, in coordination with the Coast Guard. The National Police would seek to increase staffing at the Juanchaco police station. It was also arranged that the community would inform the Coast Guard Commander with jurisdiction in Buenaventura of the movement of Community Council boats so that appropriate accompaniment could be provided through technological means. It was agreed to hold a meeting between the captains of Community Council vessels and the Maritime Authority to address a navigation strategy in coordination with the Harbor Master's Office. It was also agreed that the National Ombudsperson's Office would take steps to link Community Council vessels to the "Comprehensive Maritime Positioning System" project, implemented in coordination with the Harbor Master's Office. The UNP committed to sending the beneficiaries a report on the status of implementation of collective protection measures, including a tentative delivery date for vessels and 40 radios. The Presidential Council for Human Rights would request review of individual protection cases before the UNP.

34. On December 19, 2025, the State indicated that the UNP adopted collective measures for the Community Council of the black communities of La Plata Bahía Málaga pursuant to Resolution 3702 of April 15, 2025. It was detailed that 13 cellular communication devices were implemented on June 26, 2025 and a type 1 protection scheme consisting of a conventional vehicle and two protection persons with an ethnic differential approach on July 7, 2025. It was stated that delivery of 40 radios and two fiberglass boats was planned, although pending due to budget availability. The State added that the Technical Team for Collective Risk Assessment (CTARC) finalized work order 709 on February 17, 2024, with no pending orders, and that the duration of the measures remained one year, renewable in light of new risk events.

35. Finally, the State reported that, in the framework of the investigation into threats against Saúl Valencia and Andrés Felipe Moreno Díaz, the Prosecutor's Office requested protection from the UNP and the Valle del Cauca Police. It added that the investigation remained active at the preliminary inquiry stage. On September 25, 2025, a methodological plan was prepared establishing a 45-day period for the collection of evidence.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF SERIOUSNESS, URGENCY, AND IRREPARABLE HARM

36. The precautionary measures mechanism is part of the Commission's functions of overseeing compliance with the human rights obligations established in Article 106 of the Charter of the Organization of American States. These general oversight functions are provided for in Article 41 (b) of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as in Article 18 (b) of the Statute of the IACHR; while the mechanism of precautionary measures is set forth in Article 25 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. In accordance with this Article, the IACHR grants precautionary measures in urgent and serious situations in which these measures are necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of a petition or case before the organs of the inter-American system.

37. The Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("the Inter-American Court" or "I/A Court H.R.") have established repeatedly that precautionary and provisional measures have a dual nature, both protective and precautionary.⁸ Regarding the protective nature, these measures seek to avoid irreparable harm and to protect the exercise of human rights.⁹ To do this, the IACHR shall assess the problem raised, the effectiveness of state actions to address the situation described, and how vulnerable the persons proposed as beneficiaries would be left in case the measures are not adopted.¹⁰ Regarding their precautionary nature, these measures have the purpose of preserving a legal situation while under study by the organs of the inter-American system. Their precautionary nature aims at safeguarding the rights at risk until the petition pending before the inter-American system is resolved. Their object and purpose are to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of an eventual decision on the merits and, thus, avoid any further infringement of the rights at issue, a situation that may adversely affect the useful effect of the final decision. In this regard, precautionary or provisional measures allow the State concerned to comply with the final decision and, if necessary, to implement the ordered reparations. In the process of reaching a decision, according to Article 25(2) of its Rules of Procedure, the Commission considers that:

- a. "serious situation" refers to a grave impact that an action or omission can have on a protected right or on the eventual effect of a pending decision in a case or petition before the organs of the inter-American system;
- b. "urgent situation" refers to risk or threat that is imminent and can materialize, thus requiring immediate preventive or protective action; and
- c. "irreparable harm" refers to injury to rights which, due to their nature, would not be susceptible to reparation, restoration or adequate compensation.

38. In analyzing those requirements, the Commission reiterates that the facts supporting a request for precautionary measures need not be proven beyond doubt; rather, the information provided should be assessed from a *prima facie*¹¹ standard of review to determine whether a serious and urgent situation exists. Similarly, the Commission recalls that, by its own mandate, it is not called upon to determine any individual

⁸ Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court H.R.), [Matter of the Yare I and Yare II Capital Region Penitentiary Center](#), Provisional Measures regarding the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Order of March 30, 2006, considerandum 5; [Case of Carpio Nicolle et al. v. Guatemala](#), Provisional Measures, Order of July 6, 2009, considerandum 16.

⁹ I/A Court H.R., [Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center](#), Provisional Measures regarding Venezuela, Order of February 8, 2008, considerandum 8; [Case of Bámaca Velásquez](#), Provisional Measures regarding Guatemala, Order of January 27, 2009, considerandum 45; [Matter of Fernández Ortega et al.](#), Provisional Measures regarding Mexico, Order of April 30, 2009, considerandum 5; [Matter of Milagro Sala](#), Provisional Measures regarding Argentina, Order of November 23, 2017, considerandum 5.

¹⁰ I/A Court H.R., [Matter of Milagro Sala](#), Provisional Measures regarding Argentina, Order of November 23, 2017, considerandum 5 (Available only in Spanish); [Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center](#), Provisional Measures regarding Venezuela, Order of February 8, 2008, considerandum 9; [Matter of the Criminal Institute of Plácido de Sá Carvalho](#), Provisional Measures regarding Brazil, Order of February 13, 2017, considerandum 6 (Available only in Spanish).

¹¹ I/A Court H.R., [Matter of Members of the Miskitu Indigenous Peoples of the North Caribbean Coast regarding Nicaragua](#), Extension of Provisional Measures, Order of August 23, 2018, considerandum 13 (Available only in Spanish); [Matter of children and adolescents deprived of liberty in the "Complexo do Tatuapé" of the Fundação CASA](#), Extension of Provisional Measures regarding Brazil, Order of July 4, 2006, considerandum 23.

liabilities for the facts alleged. Moreover, in this proceeding, it is not appropriate to rule on violations of rights enshrined in the American Convention or other applicable instruments.¹² This is better suited to be addressed by the Petition and Case system. The following analysis refers exclusively to the requirements of Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure, which can be resolved without making any determinations on the merits¹³.

39. With regard to the foregoing, Article 25(7) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure establishes that decisions "granting, extending, modifying or lifting precautionary measures shall be adopted through reasoned resolutions." Similarly, Article 25(9) provides that the Commission shall evaluate periodically, at its own initiative or at the request of either party, whether to maintain, modify or lift the precautionary measures in force. The Commission shall evaluate whether the serious and urgent situation and the risk of irreparable harm that caused the adoption of the precautionary measures persist. Furthermore, it shall consider whether there are new situations that may comply with the requirements outlined in Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure. Similarly, Article 25(10) establishes that the Commission shall take appropriate follow-up measures, such as requesting relevant information from the interested parties on any matter related to the granting, observance and maintenance of precautionary measures. These measures may include, as appropriate, timetables for implementation, hearings, working meetings, and visits for follow-up and review. Through Resolution 2/2020¹⁴ of April 15, 2020, the IACHR ruled on the possibility of issuing Follow-up Resolutions.

40. On this occasion, the Commission decides to issue a Follow-up and Extension Resolution in these precautionary measures considering the information sent by the parties.

A. Context of violence and presence of criminal and armed groups in the area

41. In granting these precautionary measures, the IACHR assessed the current context in the area. At the time, the high levels of violence in the Pacific region of Colombia and the resulting impacts on Afro-descendant and farming communities were emphasized.¹⁵ The information available showed that armed groups had set up camps in areas adjacent to the communities, which implied a strong increase in daily control over the territories and their inhabitants, affecting their free self-determination and security.¹⁶ The IACHR observed that the influence of these groups was exercised through threats, harassment and assassinations of people in leadership positions, but also through acts of corruption and financing of activities and basic needs of the communities that had no institutional means of doing so.¹⁷

42. The IACHR resolution is in line with Early Alert 039, issued by the Colombian Ombudsperson's Office on December 4, 2023. In it, it was stated that armed actors "are implementing actions such as the banishment from the territories of the most representative leaders in the defense and promotion of collective claims and rights, which, incidentally, undermines the social fabric and its capacity for resistance to the forms of violence undertaken."¹⁸ The Ombudsperson's Office established that La Plata Bahía Málaga is within the "tourist area of beaches" identified as one of the four scenarios presenting a risk and threat in the rural area of the District of Buenaventura that is characterized by the simultaneous presence and the dispute for territorial

¹² IACHR, [Resolution No. 2/2015](#), Precautionary Measure No. 455-13, Matter Nestora Salgado regarding Mexico, January 28, 2015, para. 14; [Resolution No. 37/2021](#), Precautionary Measure No. 96/21, Gustavo Adolfo Mendoza Beteta and family regarding Nicaragua, April 30, 2021, para. 33.

¹³ In this regard, the Court has indicated that "[it] cannot, in a provisional measure, consider the merits of any arguments pertaining to issues other than those which relate strictly to the extreme gravity and urgency and the necessity to avoid irreparable damage to persons." See: I/A Court H.R. [Matter of James et al. regarding Trinidad and Tobago](#), Provisional Measures, Order of August 29, 1998, considerandum 6; [Matter of Barrios Family v. Venezuela](#), Provisional Measures, Order of April 22, 2021, considerandum 2.

¹⁴ IACHR, [Resolution 2/2020](#), Strengthening of the Monitoring of Precautionary Measures in Force, April 15, 2020.

¹⁵ IACHR, [Resolution 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, para. 24.

¹⁶ IACHR, [Resolution 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, para. 24.

¹⁷ IACHR, [Resolution 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, para. 24.

¹⁸ Ombudsperson's Office of Colombia, [Early Alert 039](#), December 4, 2023, p. 49.

control between various armed groups.¹⁹ The so-called Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), for example, had a continuous advance on the beach areas. On the other hand, “Los Shottas” had a growing presence in Juanchaco, Ladrilleros and La Barra, and had advanced towards La Plata Bahía Málaga. Regarding these groups, the Ombudsperson’s Office stressed that they are financed by extortion, and have clashed over territorial control. The National Liberation Army (ELN), a more recent arrival actor, carried out patrols through the mouth of the San Juan and La Barra Beach, and had a presence in Puerto España.²⁰

43. In the Early Warning, the Ombudsperson’s Office reported having knowledge of threatening calls received by several leaders of the Community Councils of La Plata-Bahía Málaga, presumably by the AGC.²¹ These threats, in turn, generated anxiety and fear of moving to other beaches or to the city of Buenaventura, affecting the freedom of mobility of the leaders. “Los Shottas,” for example, had carried out thefts from boats.²² These groups engaged in the recruitment of children, prompting families to send their teenage or young adult children out of the city (to Buenaventura or Cali) to avoid recruitment.²³ This disruption of the social fabric was emphasized by the Ombudsperson’s Office when it revealed that armed groups involve the population in activities such as the transport of goods, troops and even weapons; a situation that results in threats, accusations and fragmentation of community relations²⁴.

44. In line with the information available in the file, the IACHR understands that the situation of violence continues in the area. In June 2025, the 38th periodic report of the Secretary General to the Permanent Council on the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia indicated that the department of Valle del Cauca continues to be one of the most affected by the resurgence of the armed conflict, with the active presence of several armed groups such as the so-called Central General Staff (EMC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) and factions of the Bolivarian Army (57 Yair Bermúdez Front).²⁵ Consequently, there were clashes between these groups, especially on the Pacific coast and

¹⁹ “In the rural context, there is the presence of the AGC, the ELN and dissident factions of the former FARC-EP called Second Marquetalia and Jaime Martínez Front (the latter belonging to the EMC). As can be seen in Map No. 2, the AGC are concentrated in the Calima and San Juan region, and, more recently, in the beach areas of Ladrilleros, Juanchaco, Bazán Bocana and La Plata Bahía Málaga; likewise, they have a presence in the city through the modality of criminal *outsourcing*. The ELN is present in the same area as the AGC (except for the beaches, where they are trying to enter) and is currently withdrawn into the jungles. In the southern/central rivers, the ELN is also present, as well as in commune 12 of the city and on the road or road to the sea (Cisneros). The dissident faction of the Second Marquetalia, for its part, has an alliance with the ELN and is located in the same areas; however, both groups have lost combat capacity due to casualties and demobilizations. Lastly, in the rural area of Buenaventura, it is possible to identify actions of the dissident faction Jaime Martínez Front of the Commander Jacobo Arenas Western Bloc, which has been consolidating its presence in the area of the rivers of the south/center, seriously affecting the civilian population due to the fighting, threats, homicides, confinements, and, above all, massive and individual forced displacements to the urban and intraveredal center.” Ombudsperson’s Office of Colombia, [Early Warning 039](#), previously cited, p. 29.

²⁰ Ombudsperson’s Office of Colombia, [Early Warning 039](#), previously cited, p. 42.

²¹ Ombudsperson’s Office of Colombia, [Early Warning 039](#), previously cited, p. 42.

²² Ombudsperson’s Office of Colombia, [Early Warning 039](#), previously cited, p. 42.

²³ “[T]he recruitment of children has been another behavior that poses risks for this population group, given the strongest pressures from the Shottas and the AGC, in Juanchaco, Ladrilleros and La Barra, many families decide to send their children to Buenaventura or Cali avoiding that their children are recruited, a strategy used by armed groups -mainly Shottas- is that of offering money, alcohol, motorcycles and luxuries.” Ombudsperson’s Office of Colombia, [Early Warning 039](#), previously cited, p. 42.

²⁴ “Both that group [ELN] and the AGC are allegedly involving the population in activities related to armed groups, such as transporting goods, troops, and even weapons. This situation has been occurring throughout the beach area, generating threats and accusations from armed groups toward the population. In addition, this is fragmenting community relations since people distrust their neighbors.” Ombudsperson’s Office of Colombia, [Early Warning 039](#), previously cited, p. 42.

²⁵ The report noted that “[t]he EMC [Central General Staff] remained on the sidelines of the MDP [Peace Dialogue Table] and concentrated its actions in municipalities of (...) Valle del Cauca”; “the ELN made a presence in municipalities of (...) Valle del Cauca”; “the AGC [Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia] concentrated their actions in municipalities of (...) Valle del Cauca (...)” Organization of American States (OAS), General Secretariat, [Thirty-eighth periodic report on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States \(MAPP/OAS\)](#), OAS/Ser.G. CP/doc.6121/25, June 9, 2025, p. 6. “In turn, the 57th Yair Bermúdez Bolivarian Army Front (...) clashed with EMC structures in northeastern Cauca and in the center and south of Valle del Cauca.” “In addition, confrontation between the ELC and the EMC persisted in the department of Arauca, in regions of the northeast and Pacific coast of Cauca, and in Buenaventura in Valle del Cauca.” “In the midst of these scenarios, some AG [armed groups] carried out movements of their

Buenaventura.²⁶ Actions committed against the population included extortion, forced disappearances, and displacement in rural and urban areas. In addition, there are environmental impacts due to illicit economies, with pollution from water sources and deforestation in strategic areas.²⁷ Buenaventura, in particular, is said to constitute a critical point where there are disputes for control between urban groups such as “Los Shottas” and “Los Espartanos.” In this regard, a Socio-legal Conversation Space (ECSJ) was installed to reduce violence and advance local peace agreements; which led to a truce between the aforementioned groups, which lasted from August 2024 to February 2025.²⁸ As the Commission has recently stressed, “[i]n Buenaventura and nearby areas, the community councils have denounced the lack of historical participation in the peace dialogues, which has allowed armed groups such as the Chotas and the Espartanos to control the territories, exacerbating different acts of violence, as well as the increase in arms trafficking, kidnappings and human trafficking.”²⁹

B. Implementation of the precautionary measures

45. The Commission appreciates the efforts made by the State, in particular by the UNP, to implement **protection measures** in favor of the beneficiaries. According to the information provided by the parties, it is noted that a collective risk workshop was held and that individual protection measures were implemented with respect to three beneficiaries: Santiago Valencia, Argenis Valencia and Saúl Valencia.

46. However, the information received shows that these measures have not been suitable or sufficient to mitigate the existing risk. In particular, the representation has alleged that the panic buttons and bulletproof vests are not functional in a territory without signal coverage, and that the accompaniment of the protection personnel only reaches the port of Buenaventura and does not extend to the maritime route or to the community territory, where the events reported against the community occur. Observations have also been raised regarding the visibility involved in the implementation of protection persons for people at risk. The Commission understands that domestic appeals have been filed in this regard, but the information available is not sufficient to know how the State made the necessary adjustments to the protection details implemented in light of the observations made by the beneficiaries. The Commission also notes the adoption of collective measures and observes that they reflect progress towards the protection of beneficiaries. However, the lack of complete and timely implementation of the planned elements limits the effectiveness of the measures in the context described.

47. The Commission considers it relevant that the parties send updated information on the measures implemented with respect to each of the beneficiaries or, failing that, if there are protection routes or risk studies in progress.

48. In this regard, the Commission recalls that the protection measures must be culturally appropriate and agreed upon with the beneficiaries and their representation. The Commission appreciates the holding of **consultation and follow-up meetings** between the parties, as well as the subsequent actions, such as the holding of a collective risk workshop with the UNP and follow-up meetings between 2024 and 2025. At this point, the Commission stresses the commitments acquired around actions to guarantee the safety of the beneficiaries such as coverage operations in the territory by the Infantry Brigade, the evaluation of the increase

members, including children and adolescents who were victims of forced recruitment, to strengthen the structures involved in the territorial disputes in (...)” Valle del Cauca (...)” Organization of American States (OAS), General Secretariat, [Thirty-eighth periodic report on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States \(MAPP/OAS\)](#), previously cited, p. 7.

²⁶ Organization of American States (OAS), General Secretariat, [Thirty-eighth periodic report on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States \(MAPP/OAS\)](#), previously cited, pp. 5-8.

²⁷ “Illegal extraction from mining deposits continued to contaminate water sources and generate deforestation scenarios in (...) Valle del Cauca (...)” Organization of American States (OAS), General Secretariat, [Thirty-eighth periodic report on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States \(MAPP/OAS\)](#), previously cited, p. 28.

²⁸ Organization of American States (OAS), General Secretariat, [Thirty-eighth periodic report on the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia of the Organization of American States \(MAPP/OAS\)](#), previously cited, p. 19.

²⁹ IACHR, The Impacts of Violence on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 258/25, November 10, 2025, para. 152.

in the strength of the Juanchaco police station, the accompaniment by technological means of the Community Council vessels or the initiation of a dialogue for a navigation strategy.

49. On these spaces and the agreements concluded there, the Commission stresses the importance of setting a clear implementation roadmap or schedule that results in their effectiveness. Thus, it is emphasized that, in 2023, agreements were concluded with the Community Councils and ethnic-territorial organizations of the Black Communities Process that included aspects relevant to the protection of the beneficiaries of the precautionary measures, such as the prioritization of protection measures.³⁰ Similarly, the Commission notes that, according to the information submitted by the State, after the humanitarian mission of February 2024 it was planned to convene an Inter-Agency Follow-up Committee, for which there is no information in this file.³¹ The Commission considers it appropriate for the parties to provide information on these aspects in their subsequent communications.

50. Regarding **investigations**, the information provided by the parties accounts for proceedings registered before different prosecutors' offices and at various procedural stages. In relation to the inactive investigations, the Commission highlights that four of them were archived due to the impossibility of establishing an active subject. Regarding the active investigations, the Commission notes that the latest information submitted by the State refers to actions in 2024 and that none of them obtained results aimed at mitigating the risk to which the beneficiaries are exposed. The proceedings for the events of September 10, 2024, resulted in the capture of an alleged perpetrator, who was released due to the expiration of terms, despite the existence of a complaint for the threats issued against Saúl Valencia and Andrés Felipe Moreno Díaz.

51. The Commission recalls what was indicated at the time of the granting of these precautionary measures in the sense that having updated information is a relevant aspect when establishing the risk that the beneficiaries allegedly face and the possibilities of their recurrence, especially when considering that armed groups continue to operate in the territory of the Community Council.³² The Commission also emphasizes that, in the case of crimes against human rights defenders, acts of violence cannot be analyzed as isolated incidents, but must be investigated comprehensively within a context that allows for the identification of all the elements necessary to understand the structures that were involved in the commission of the crimes.³³ The guidelines that govern investigations involve assessing human rights defense activities as a central hypothesis, as well as possible patterns of violence or systematic attacks.³⁴ Furthermore, as the Commission has pointed out, Afro-Colombian communities are subject to greater vulnerability due to existing structural problems, as well as persistent institutional and social discrimination and historical exclusion.³⁵ In this sense, it is important to incorporate a differentiated ethnic-racial, gender and intersectional approach both in the investigation and in the prosecution, sanction or reparation.³⁶

C. Extension of beneficiaries: members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council

52. The Commission takes note of the culturally differentiated nature of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council, made up of the communities of La Plata, Miramar, La Sierpe and Mangaña, located in the Biogeographic Chocó ecosystem. The information received indicates that the territory has been subject to

³⁰ IACHR, [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, para. 6.

³¹ IACHR, [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, paras. 17, 27.

³² IACHR, [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, para. 30.

³³ IACHR, [Third Report. Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas](#), OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 119/25, April 15, 2025, para. 318.

³⁴ IACHR, [Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, previously cited, para. 318.](#)

³⁵ IACHR, [Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders and Social Leaders in Colombia](#), OAS/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 262, December 6, 2019, para. 65. These elements, as indicated by the IACHR, must be taken into account by the States when analyzing the context. Cf. IACHR, [Towards Effective Integral Protection Policies for Human Rights Defenders](#), OAS/Ser.L/V/II. 207/17, December 29, 2017, para. 270.

³⁶ IACHR, [Third Report. Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, previously cited, para. 338.10.](#)

multiple pressures derived from strategic projects and it is also recalled the information provided by the humanitarian mission of February 2024 according to which the State is aware of the interest of illegal armed groups in the region because it is the Bonaverense Pacific mobility corridor.³⁷ Furthermore, the Commission takes into account the organizational structure of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council, as well as the centrality of maritime transport for this “coastal community.”

53. In light of all the available information, the Commission assesses that the risk that led to the granting of the precautionary measures remains unchanged to date, having been extended to the members of the collective. The information received indicates that illegal armed groups have exercised territorial control through extortion, direct threats, and acts of violence, including the interception of boats, confiscation of cell phones, sending of intimidating messages, and theft. These alleged acts have not been limited to individual beneficiaries, but have also affected various members of the community, such as teachers, relatives of beneficiaries, residents, and other leaders, in a context of violence and fear of possible reprisals for filing internal complaints.

54. The Commission understands that the State recognizes the need for collective protection of the beneficiaries, and that the Ministry of the Interior has requested the initiation of collective protection proceedings, based on the presence of numerous armed groups in the district of Buenaventura. In addition, the Commission notes that the identified risk materialized in the murder of Alan Valencia, a young member of the Community Council, on September 11, 2025, in the city of Buenaventura. The victim was a direct relative of beneficiaries of the precautionary measures, who had repeatedly denounced the harassment against the community. The Commission regrets the loss of life of the young Valencia, and notes that the events occurred after death threats were received.

55. Consequently, the Commission considers that there are sufficient grounds to extend the scope of beneficiaries and the requests made to the State.

56. As this is a request for extension, it is necessary to analyze the requirement of “**factual connection**” with the events that justified the initial adoption of the precautionary measures.³⁸ In that sense, the Commission observes that the context that existed at the time the precautionary measures were granted is related to the situation reported by the parties throughout the time these measures have been in force. In fact, the information available shows the continued presence of various armed groups and other criminal groups, who have allegedly carried out actions against the members of the collective. In addition, the new events are shared, both by those who exercise leadership and those who do not. This may be related to the collective position of the members of the Community Council not to give in to extortion by criminal groups operating in the area. In this regard, the Commission considers that the factual connection has been proven.

57. Regarding the **seriousness** requirement, the Commission notes that, during the term of the precautionary measures, the risk factors identified have persisted over time. These events have occurred with respect to the members of the Bahía La Plata Community Council, as characterized throughout the proceedings, that is, in relation to the inhabitants of La Plata, Miramar, La Sierpe, and Mangaña. In this regard, it should be noted that extortion actions by members of armed or criminal groups have continued to occur, among others. In addition, the risk has materialized in the murder of Alan Valencia in 2025, who, although not an individualized beneficiary of these precautionary measures, was a member of the Community Council. These facts, together with the threats against those who exercise leadership, reflect an impact on people who are directly threatened, as well as their families and other members of the community. Furthermore, as previously

³⁷IACHR, [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), Precautionary Measure No. 73-24, previously cited, para. 16.

³⁸ In that sense, see: IACHR, Resolution No. 64/2023 (Follow-up and Extension), Precautionary Measure No. 576-21, [José Domingo Pérez Gómez and his family unit regarding Peru](#), November 8, 2023, para. 82; IACHR, Resolution No. 59/2022 (Extension and Follow-up), Precautionary Measure No. 449-22, [Identified members of the “União dos Povos Indígenas do Vale de Javari” - UNIVAIA \(Union of Indigenous Peoples of Vale do Javari - UNIVAIA\)](#), October 27, 2022, para. 44; IACHR, Resolution No. 10/17, Precautionary Measure No. 393-15 [Detainees in “Punta Coco” regarding Panama](#), March 22, 2017, para. 28; I/A Court H.R., [Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico](#), Provisional Measures, Order of November 23, 2010, considerandum 11.

assessed, none of the investigations obtained results aimed at mitigating the risk to which the proposed beneficiaries are exposed.

58. The Commission observes with concern that the attacks against the members of the Community Council constitute a strategy aimed at disrupting social and cultural life. For example, interception, theft, and threats on maritime routes restrict freedom of movement and affect community life, a situation that in turn has repercussions on various aspects such as the search for livelihoods for community members and the education of children. In this sense, there are difficulties in guaranteeing safe transport to schools, threats against educators and the suspension of educational activities. Therefore, the Commission notes that the identified risk factors generate individual impacts with collective repercussions; and that territorial control by armed groups undermines the autonomy and cohesion of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council. Considering the above, the Commission assesses that the risk initially identified remains in place and also affects the persons proposed as beneficiaries, members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council. These persons are *prima facie* in a situation presenting a serious risk to their rights to life and personal integrity.

59. As for the requirement of **urgency**, the Commission understands that, despite the granting of the precautionary measures in 2024, the risk has continued to date. To the extent that the beneficiaries and proposed beneficiaries continue their activities in the Community Council, the risk is likely to continue and be exacerbated over time. In view of the above, and taking into account the lack of implementation of effective and adequate protection measures to mitigate the risk, the Commission considers that it is urgent to adopt immediate measures to safeguard the life and personal integrity of the members of the Community Council.

60. Regarding the requirement of **irreparable harm**, the Commission concludes that it has been met, insofar as the potential impact on the rights to life and personal integrity, by their very nature, constitutes the maximum situation of irreparability.

61. Consequently, the Commission decides that these precautionary measures shall apply to all members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council. The Commission urges the parties to continue concerted efforts to implement effective measures to comply with the precautionary measures, and to make progress in solutions to the risk source.

V. BENEFICIARIES

62. The Commission declares beneficiaries to all members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council, composed of nearly 274 families in four communities (La Plata, Miramar, La Sierpe, and Mangaña), located in Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca. These individuals are identifiable under the terms of Article 25(6)(b) of the IACHR Rules of Procedure, given that they constitute a group that is clearly identified by its cultural, organizational, and territorial affiliation.

VI. DECISION

63. Considering the factual and legal arguments presented by both parties, the Commission follows up on [Resolution No. 19/2024](#), decides to extend the scope of its decision and requires that the State of Colombia:

- a) Strengthen the implementation of the necessary measures to effectively protect the life and personal integrity of the beneficiaries identified in Resolution 19/2024;
- b) Extend the precautionary measures in favor of all members of the La Plata Bahía Málaga Community Council and adopt the necessary and culturally appropriate measures to safeguard the life and personal integrity of the beneficiaries. In particular, those of a collective nature that allow for the effective security of the members of the Community Council;

- c) Implement the necessary protective measures so that beneficiaries can continue to carry out their activities in defense of human rights without being subjected to threats, intimidation, harassment, or acts of violence;
- d) Consult and agree upon the measures to be adopted with the beneficiaries and/or their representatives; and
- e) Report on the actions taken to investigate the alleged facts that gave rise to this precautionary measure, so as to prevent such events from reoccurring.

64. The Commission decides to continue to carry out the appropriate follow-up measures in terms of Article 25(10) and other provisions of its Rules of Procedure.

65. The Commission requests that the parties submit the requested information to the Commission within 30 days from the date of this resolution.

66. The Commission instructs its Executive Secretariat to notify this Resolution to the State of Colombia and the representation.

67. Approved on January 19, 2026, by José Luis Caballero Ochoa, President; Andrea Pochak, First Vice-President; Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana, Second Vice-President; Gloria Monique de Mees; Riyad Insanally; Marion Bethel; and Rosa María Payá Acevedo, members of the IACHR.

Tania Reneaum Panszi
Executive Secretary