November 5, 2025 - Washington, DC
Thank you very much, Chairperson. I want to say good morning to all the distinguished permanent representatives and delegates, distinguished ambassadors, and our colleagues from the Secretariat.
I thank you all—Member States—for your continued attention and commitment to supporting the process regarding the Republic of Haiti, and for the work accomplished so far. Today’s presentation, which we committed to provide roughly every two months, is an update on where we stand. While this is not precisely on that schedule, we believe it is important to share recent developments and updates.
We are all aware of the situation in Haiti and our grave concerns. At this point, we are focusing on two specific issues. First, security; I will return to that in more detail shortly. This relates to gang activity and its impact on communities and governance. Second, governance after February 2026, when the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council formally ends. These are our top two priorities.
Of course, other matters are also critical. Humanitarian assistance and the electoral process require attention, but progress on both depends heavily on those two priority areas. Turning to the first slide: over the past couple of weeks, we have worked closely with the Haitian leadership—the President of the TPC and Prime Minister Fils-Aimé.
We have held multiple calls and consulted in the margins of several meetings. That connection—that relationship with the Haitian leadership—is excellent, and I am very pleased to report that.
We have also coordinated with our international partners. At the United Nations, Ambassador Jenka, formerly the Assistant Secretary-General, has been replaced. We work very closely with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Haiti, Mr. Massieu, and with the technical lead on Haiti, Ms. Flores, at headquarters. We also work closely with CARICOM and the Eminent Persons Group (EPG). CARICOM has determined it will play a political role in this regard.
These communications and coordination efforts are ongoing. We have also intensified our engagement with the U.S. mission in Haiti—Ambassador Wooster and colleagues—as well as with the U.S. State Department. We share this because we are approaching a critical point for Haiti. Time is running out, and we need to step up our commitment in concrete terms.
You may already have received— and permanent observers are in the process of receiving—Revision Three of the Roadmap. As the cover indicates, it incorporates priorities identified by Haitian authorities at the technical level and reflects Prime Minister Fils-Aimé’s recent visit to the OAS.
At this point, the document titled “Towards a Haitian-Led Roadmap for Stability and Peace with Regional and International Support” is supported by the OAS, the Republic of Haiti, and CARICOM, and is also endorsed by the United Nations. In this context, Revision Three translates those priorities into specific actions under five pillars, for which we will ask Member States to provide support. Our immediate focus is on security, political dialogue, and the roadmap toward elections.
Another important development—the strong support from our membership for the United Nations Security Council resolution—sent a powerful signal of hemispheric unity. That resolution replaces the MSS during this transitional phase. The intention is to institutionalize the UN support office in Haiti on April 1.
This leaves a gap between January and April that must be bridged. Additional resources are required; several Member States are already discussing this. One urgent matter concerns the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). In this context, several issues must be settled: leadership, the appointment of a Special Representative for the GSF, and financing. These are the three key elements.
We must assemble the force, establish its military leadership, and appoint a civilian Special Representative for the GSF. To be clear, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative remains in place. There will also be a Special Representative of the OAS Secretary General.
To avoid confusion: there will be three Special Representatives, including one civilian specifically for the GSF. That process will be advanced in the coming days. We appeal to OAS Member States to present candidates, which can be done through the Standing Group of Partners at the United Nations. Member States wishing to present a candidate for the GSF Special Representative would be welcomed by all actors involved. We continue to work very closely with the United Nations office. In addition, on November 12 there will be a virtual partners’ meeting convened by the OAS with a specific agenda.
Participants will include the United Nations (political and technical), the OAS (political and technical), the Caribbean Community (both levels), and Haitian leadership. We have been discussing attendance with the President of the Transitional Presidential Council, Mr. Saint-Cyr. Given the agenda, participation will also be at the technical level. We follow Haiti’s lead on these matters; that leadership is essential.
Given the agenda, we have also included the U.S. mission in Haiti in this round of coordination—Ambassador Wooster and colleagues, along with others from across the U.S. government.
The three agenda items -and I hope we can make progress because gang violence continues to take an enormous—and growing—toll on the people of Haiti, perhaps the lack of visible action emboldens the gangs, which makes progress all the more urgent- are as follows:
First, security: specifically, follow-up to the UN resolution—how the gang-suppression force will be established; which countries will contribute; under what guidance; under what rules of engagement and governing regulations; how it will be financed; and who will lead it. These are the three major elements for discussion on security. It is important to begin sooner rather than later because, on the ground, we see gangs moving with apparent freedom to operate.
Second, political dialogue and governance. We will listen closely to CARICOM’s perspectives, particularly those of the EPG. I will meet with the Chair responsible for foreign relations on the margins of an upcoming meeting in Santa Marta. From that group of foreign ministers, a core group will be established to serve as a counterpart to this coordinating mechanism, while the EPG’s role is more technical—facilitating conversations, dialogue, and consultations.
We place significant weight on CARICOM’s views, given that it helped establish the current mechanism—the TPC. We recognize that the TPC has not delivered all that was expected, yet we cannot disregard what is in place. During the transition, we must consider CARICOM’s views, consult relevant parties, and, most importantly, heed the Haitian leadership.
From what we understand, Haitian leaders have been engaging a range of authorities and organizations in Haiti. We want to hear their views on securing legitimate, accepted, and recognized governance arrangements after the first week of February 2026. This is important because— as authorities in Haiti stated yesterday—holding elections before February 2026 is quite difficult. We will therefore need legitimate or otherwise approved governance structures after February 2026 to accompany the electoral process.
That will be critical to setting Haiti’s future agenda. Mr. Chairman, I understand my time is up. I didn’t hear the bell ring, so I thought you might let me continue.
I will not abuse the time. I will conclude by noting that the Secretary General intended to travel to Haiti at the end of October, but that visit did not occur due to Hurricane Melissa. The intention is to do so as soon as possible, in collaboration with the Haitian authorities. We are now looking at early December.
If that works out, we will have an opportunity, after the November 12 meeting, to delve further into the immediate priorities. We will make sure you receive a written presentation.
Thank you very much for your attention.